

4-1164

MAY 9 1953

The Honorable Arthur V. Watkins
 Chairman
 Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee
 Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I make reference to your letter of 13 March 1953 in which you requested this Agency to furnish information obtained outside the United States for inclusion in the public record of the Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee. The information desired by you was to be based on public lists of aliens presently in the United States, attached in an official capacity to Iron Curtain Consulates, Embassies, and international organizations.

A basic fact, which you probably know, is that the restrictive controls presently in effect in Soviet and satellite areas limit travel to those persons serving government interests in an official or quasi-official capacity. Such persons are almost without exception confirmed Communists with long records of service to the Communist Party. Accordingly, our response to your query concerning subversive or Communist activity has been confined to clandestine activity.

The Department of State furnished this Agency with the following public listings of aliens falling within this category.

- 1) Diplomatic List, Department of State - January 1953.
- 2) List of Employees of Diplomatic Missions (Not Printed in the "Diplomatic List") - March 1953.
- 3) Foreign Consular Offices in the United States, April 1, 1952.
- 4) Permanent Missions and Delegations to the United Nations, No. 35, March 1953.
- 5) Members of Delegations to the United Nations Entitled to Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities - March 1953.

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6) Staff of the United Nations Secretariat, 31 August 1952.

A review of these lists produced the names of 307 individuals (excluding wives and dependants) from Iron Curtain countries.

Of this number 62 have been reported by CIA sources as having been engaged in, or suspected of having been engaged in, espionage, subversive or Communist activity prior to their arrival in the United States. This does not include information made available by other U. S. Government agencies.

The following table was compiled pursuant to your request.

Category	Total Names	No relevant Information	Information (Total)	Intelligence Activity	Communist or Other Subversive Activity
Consulates and Embassies					
Employees of Consulates and Embassies					
Missions to the UN					
Employees of UN Secretariat					
Total					

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N.B.: The discrepancy in the total listed for column 4 and the combined totals of columns 5 and 6 is due to the fact that certain individuals are listed in two categories.

The above tabulations pertain to questions 1, 3, 5 and 6 of your letter.

The following information is set forth in response to question 2 of your letter, requesting a description of a typical pattern of such a record of active work for an intelligence service:

The use of positions in diplomatic installations of Iron Curtain countries as cover for intelligence officers and agents is well-confirmed. The first major post-war case which received widespread attention involved Colonel Nikolai Zabotin, who served in Canada as Soviet Military Attache. His extensive espionage activities were

disclosed in September 1945 by Igor Gzenko, the Soviet Embassy code clerk who sought refuge with the Canadian authorities. As examples of more recent instances which have been disclosed in various areas of the world, the following cases are noted:

1) Joseph Szozerbinski, Polish Vice Consul in France, was arrested by the French Police in November 1949 for offenses against the national security of France. The exact charges were not specified. He was expelled by the French Government on 1 July 1950.

2) On 14 May 1951, the Yugoslav Government announced the arrest of Jaroslav Nemec, secretary to the Military Attache of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Belgrade on charges of espionage. The official statement alleged that Nemec had been caught in the act of receiving military espionage materials from Captain Loudovit Kovac, a radar expert in the Yugoslav Army. Nemec and Captain Kovac later confessed to committing espionage against Yugoslavia.

3) Nikolai P. Orlov, a clerk in the office of the Naval Attache of the Soviet Embassy in Sweden, was identified as an intelligence official. In September 1951, Ernst Hilding Andersson, a non-commissioned officer in the Swedish Navy, was arrested by the Swedish Police and brought to trial shortly thereafter on charges of espionage. Andersson's subsequent confession and trial thoroughly implicated Orlov as his directing officer in the procurement of naval intelligence on behalf of the Soviet Union. Orlov was declared persona non grata by the Swedish Government and left the country in October 1951.

4) On 29 October 1951 the Netherlands Government announced the exposure of an espionage plot organized by the Czech Government in Holland and operating through a Czech secret agent known as Dr. Oldrich Neumann. Neumann had first aroused the suspicions of the Dutch Internal Security Service when he visited The Netherlands in the summer of 1950 on the pretext of auditing the books of the Czech Legation.

5) In June 1952 William R. Marshall, a radio operator in the British Foreign Office, was arrested on the charge that he had transmitted secret information to Pavel Stepanovich Kuznetsov, then Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Great Britain. The contact between Kuznetsov and Marshall was direct, many meetings between them having been observed by British officials prior to the arrest of Marshall. Marshall was found guilty, and on 12 July 1952, the British Government requested the recall of Kuznetsov.

6) Lieutenant Colonel Adam Kornecki, Military Attache in the Polish Embassy, Sweden, was declared persona non grata by the Swedish Foreign Office in July 1952. No reasons were officially announced, but according to Swedish newspaper reports Kornecki was expelled for attempting to photograph military airfields and installations, and was further suspected of heading an espionage network engaged in spying on Polish refugees in Sweden.

7) Lev Konstantinovich Pisarev, Tass correspondent in The Netherlands, was arrested in December 1952 by the Dutch Police because of evidence that he had tried to spy on the defenses of The Netherlands, and had recruited a minor Dutch civil servant for this purpose. Pisarev was expelled by the Netherlands Government on 25 February 1953.

8) On 1 March 1953 Konstantin Anikin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, Burma, was shot and wounded by a Burmese Army sentry when he approached a restricted military area in a private car and refused to stop when challenged.

9) On 15 April 1953 it was officially announced that Vladimir Georgievich Dekanozov had been appointed Chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in the Georgian Soviet Republic. The announcement further stated that Dekanozov had long been associated in police work with Lavrenti Pavlovich Beriya, overall head of Soviet intelligence and police affairs. Dekanozov is also known to have held positions within the Soviet Intelligence Service. Since 1940, when he served as Soviet Ambassador in Germany, he has also been prominent in Soviet diplomatic affairs.

The pattern of intelligence activity as carried out by individuals using official cover varies considerably. The official himself may engage directly in attempting to secure information; he may endeavor to recruit indigenous personnel, such as minor clerks or officers of the country in which he is stationed and act directly as their case officer, furnishing them with instructions and targets, and receiving reports from them; he may endeavor to handle them through an intermediary and thus attempt to protect his diplomatic status from exposure if discovered. The pattern may vary from area to area depending on the local security situation.

In describing a general pattern of such intelligence activity, which may apply in whole or in part to any particular intelligence agents or officials, the following factors are worthy of note:

1) These individuals are ordinarily persons whose loyalty and reliability have been rigorously investigated before they were stationed abroad. They frequently have long records of

Communist Party activity. Many of them have received extensive secret training in intelligence schools within their homelands or the USSR, and further may have exceptional technical backgrounds or practical experience in specialized fields. These qualifications are additional to the training which they may have received as diplomats to carry out their overt activities.

2) One of the primary missions assigned such intelligence officers is the collection of information on the military, political, scientific and economic developments within the country where they are stationed. Efforts are made to secure desired information which is not overtly available. This may be done by personal observation and photography of strategic installations and areas, or by the covert recruitment of agents and informants who have access to secret data or to restricted areas. Attention is given to long-range operations and to the placing of agents who may be of use at some future date or who may be turned over to succeeding officials, when the recruiting official completes his tour of duty.

3) The establishment of channels of communication within the country itself or leading back to the Soviet orbit is also a vital aspect of the intelligence officer's mission. Attempts are made to set up lines of communication which would still be operative in the event of hostilities or could be activated at such a time.

4) Great attention is given to emigre groups from the homeland who have been organized within the host country. Efforts are made to penetrate the groups and neutralize their efforts. Further attempts are made to recruit members of these emigre groups to act as intelligence agents, employing threats of blackmail or danger to their relatives remaining within the homeland.

5) A further responsibility of some intelligence officers using diplomatic cover is the surveillance and control of other members of the diplomatic installation in order to ensure their political reliability. Other officials arriving from the homeland for conferences or meetings are similarly subject to such surveillance to assure that they do not become politically unreliable through contact with Western influences.

6) The Communist Party of the country concerned is also given considerable attention by the intelligence official insofar as it furnishes a recruiting ground for potential agents and other espionage facilities. Direction and funds for the clandestine or intelligence activity of the Party are often transmitted to it directly through the intelligence officer under diplomatic cover.

Questions 4 and 7 requested a description of a pattern of such a record of subversive or Communist activity as carried out by certain officials attached to Iron Curtain Consulates and Embassies, or to international organizations. This Agency has received only a limited number of reports indicating that Iron Curtain officials use international organizations abroad as a base for intelligence activities. The Communists, of course, make use of these organizations as instrumentalities of overt subversion and dissemination of their propaganda. As you know, the number of such permanent groups is very limited. We are, therefore, unable to describe any general pattern in this regard. The following pattern is based on reported activities of Iron Curtain individuals attached to diplomatic installations. The same pattern would appear to be applicable to officials in any category to the extent that their status provided opportunity and must be considered in connection with the over-all picture of International Communism. There are about 3,750,000 Communist Party members throughout the non-Communist world. These figures do not include the membership of "front" organizations or other groups influenced or controlled by the national Communist Parties. The discipline of the Parties and their members makes them an effectual instrument for the furtherance of Soviet objectives.

- 1) One of the most important tasks of the subversive agent is the extension of Communist influence within a foreign country. Conditions in the Soviet orbit are described in glowing colors. Every effort is made to influence emigres to return. Attacks are made against the host country and the whole Western world through speeches, whispering campaigns, publications of the diplomatic installation, and through publications and facilities of the indigenous Communist Party, whose work in this field is often directed and supervised by an official using diplomatic cover.

- 2) Officials are charged with the encouragement of Communist Parties abroad, and the development of such parties into potential fifth column movements. Liaison between these parties and the Communist Party of the homeland is often maintained through an official under diplomatic cover, and he acts occasionally as an agent for the transmittal of funds, information and Communist Party literature.

- 3) Officials are also concerned with the manipulation of public opinion abroad, which is attempted through the organization of pressure groups within the country, as well as through propaganda. These pressure groups are often used to oppose or exploit political, military or judicial actions in the country, whose adoption would be contrary to the interests of the Soviet-satellite axis, or to its long-range strategic objectives.

With regard to question 8, concerning the extent to which persons in Iron Curtain Consulates and Embassies are used for active intelligence work in countries other than their homeland, it appears that every Iron Curtain Embassy has its complement of trained intelligence personnel. The size of the complement may vary considerably, being, of course, largest in Embassies in the important capitals, and perhaps being represented by only one individual in the smaller countries of lesser importance to the Soviet-satellite regimes. Iron Curtain Consulates, as well, have their intelligence arms. This again may vary considerably in size and quality. In an important strategic location, such as a port, or large manufacturing city, the intelligence complement may be large; also in areas where there is a substantial number of emigres from the homeland. In small consulates, or one-man installations, in the absence of a trained intelligence specialist, the Consuls or Vice-Consuls themselves have generalized intelligence assignments, since they represent the eyes and ears of their homeland.

With regard to question 9, concerning the extent to which persons from Iron Curtain countries in international organizations are used for active intelligence work in countries other than their homeland, information currently available indicates that the extent of such use is considerably less than in diplomatic establishments. This statement is based on information concerning international organizations abroad only, and is not intended as a comment on the possible use of the United Nations Headquarters as a base for espionage.

Apart from various arms and adjuncts of the United Nations abroad, there are few international organizations having Iron Curtain representation which meet frequently enough to provide a permanent base for sustained activity. Iron Curtain representatives to the conventions of international organizations may have limited intelligence briefs or "talent spotting" assignments. Such meetings seldom provide profitable targets for secret intelligence, and the representative's stay in the country where the meeting is held is usually of too short a duration for him to set up his facilities for obtaining intelligence, which is more readily procured by the intelligence official attached to the diplomatic installation within the country. While intelligence officials have been reported from time to time as attached to international organizations abroad, their work is more generalized, less clandestine, and less technically profitable than intelligence obtained by agents using diplomatic cover in the same area.

This Agency provides to the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation any derogatory information which we may possess concerning persons entering this country under diplomatic or official status, at the time we are advised of such an entry. Information from our files on which this present survey is based has been made available to those agencies.

In regard to the last paragraph of your above-referenced letter, please be assured that all aliens brought into this country under the provisions of Section 8, Public Law 110, are most thoroughly and extensively interrogated on all aspects of intelligence operations and personalities. The data obtained are incorporated into the permanent files of this Agency and, where pertinent, have been utilized in this study.

It is hoped that the above data and conclusions will be of assistance to you in your present investigation. Please advise me if we can provide your Committee with any further aid.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

~~SECRET~~
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

*Hand delivered
by Mr. [unclear]*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

The Honorable Arthur V. Watkins
Chairman
Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I make reference to your letter of 13 March 1953 in which you requested this Agency to furnish information obtained outside the United States for inclusion in the public record of the Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee. The information desired by you was to be based on public lists of aliens presently in the United States, attached in an official capacity to Iron Curtain Consulates, Embassies, and international organizations. *As you know,* the restrictive controls presently in effect in Soviet and satellite areas limit travel to those persons serving government interests in an official or *confirmed* quasi-official capacity. Such persons are almost without exception *disloyal* Communists with long records of service to the Communist Party. Accordingly our response to your query concerning subversive or Communist activity has been confined to clandestine activity.

The Department of State furnished this Agency with the following public listings of aliens falling within this category.

- 1) Diplomatic List, Department of State - January 1953.
- 2) List of Employees of Diplomatic Missions (Not Printed in the "Diplomatic List") - March 1953.
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Questions 4 and 7 requested a description of a pattern of such a record of subversive or Communist activity as carried out by certain officials attached to Iron Curtain Consulates and Embassies, or to international organizations. ~~This Agency has received only a limited number of reports indicating that international organizations abroad are used as a base for intelligence activity by Iron Curtain officials. They serve, of course, as instrumentalities of overt subversion and dissemination of Communist propaganda.~~ As you know, the number of such permanent groups is very limited. We are, therefore, unable to describe any general pattern in this regard. The following pattern is based on reported activities of Iron Curtain individuals attached to diplomatic installations. The same pattern would appear to be applicable to officials in any category to the extent that their status provided opportunity and must be considered in connection with the overall picture of international Communism. There are about 3,750,000 Communist Party members throughout the non-Communist world. These figures do not include the membership of "front" organizations or other groups influenced or controlled by the national Communist Parties. The discipline of the Parties and their members makes them an effectual instrument for the furtherance of Soviet objectives.

1) One of the most important tasks of the subversive agent is the extension of Communist influence within a foreign country. Conditions in the Soviet orbit are described in glowing colors. Every effort is made to influence emigres to return. Attacks are made against the host country and the whole Western world through speeches, whispering campaigns, publications of the diplomatic installation, and through publications and facilities of the indigenous Communist Party, whose work in this field is often directed and supervised by an official using diplomatic cover.

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UNITED STATES SENATE
Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization

March 13, 1953

Mr. Allen Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

1- As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization and as a member of the Internal Security Subcommittee, I have been increasingly concerned over the strong indications of subversive activity in the United States by aliens from the Iron Curtain countries who are in Consulates and Embassies and international organizations in the United States.

2- I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency does not have police, law enforcement, or internal security powers or functions within the United States but engages in the accumulation of intelligence information abroad.

3. In view of the foregoing, I respectfully request you to transmit to me for inclusion in the public record of the Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee, the following information:

✓ 1. From the public list of aliens in the Iron Curtain Consulates and Embassies in the United States, how many of the officials, attaches and affiliates of such Consulates and Embassies have records of active work for the intelligence services of their respective countries?

✓ 2. Describe a typical pattern of such record of active work for an intelligence service.

✓ 3. How many of such officials, attaches and affiliates of such Iron Curtain Consulates and Embassies have records of other subversive or Communist activity?

✓ 4. Describe a typical pattern of such record of other subversive or Communist activity.

✓ 5. From the public list of aliens from Iron Curtain countries in the United States, how many of the officials, attaches and affiliates of international organizations have records of active work for the intelligence services of their respective countries?

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Mr. Allen Dulles, Director

March 13, 1953

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✓ 6. How many of such officials, attaches and affiliates of such international organizations have records of other subversive or Communist activity?

✓ 7. Describe a typical pattern of such record of other subversive or Communist activity.

✓ 8. Describe the extent to which persons in the Iron Curtain Consulates and Embassies are used for active intelligence work in countries other than their homeland.

✓ 9. Describe the extent to which persons from Iron Curtain countries in international organizations are used for active intelligence work in countries other than their homeland.

In connection with aliens brought into the United States under the authority of Section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, the Committee would appreciate your ascertaining whether any of them have firsthand knowledge regarding the matters set forth above, and incorporating such information in your reply.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

/s/

ARTHUR V. WATKINS,
Chairman

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